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ABSTRACT
Today, algorithmic models are shaping important decisions in do-
mains such as credit, employment, healthcare, and criminal jus-
tice. At the same time, researchers and journalists have repeatedly
shown that these algorithms can have discriminatory eects. Some
organizations have tried to mitigate these eects by simply remov-
ing demographic features from an algorithm’s inputs. If an algo-
rithm is not provided with a demographic feature, one might think,
then its outputs should not discriminate with respect to that fea-
ture. This may not be true, however, when there are other features
that are correlated with that demographic feature. Today, there are
few public experiments that measure how removing demographic
inputs aects the outputs of large-scale, real-world algorithmic
systems.
In this paper, we explore the limits of this approach using a
unique opportunity created by a recent lawsuit settlement concern-
ing discrimination on Facebook’s advertising platform. In 2019,
Facebook agreed to modify its Lookalike Audiences tool—which cre-
ates target sets of users (audiences) for ads by identifying users who
share “common qualities” with users in a source audience provided
by an advertiser—by removing certain demographic features as in-
puts to its algorithm. The modied tool, called Special Ad Audiences,
is presumably intended to reduce the potential for discrimination
in target audiences. We create a series of Lookalike and Special Ad
audiences based on biased source audiences—i.e., source audiences
that have known skew along the lines of gender, age, race, and po-
litical leanings—and show that the resulting Lookalike and Special
Ad audiences both reect these biases. Importantly, these biases are
present despite the fact that Special Ad Audiences algorithm is not
provided with the demographic features along which our source
audiences are skewed.
Our results suggest that, relative to Lookalike Audiences, Special
Ad Audiences do little to reduce demographic biases in target audi-
ences. More broadly, we provide experimental proof that merely
removing demographic features from a real-world algorithmic sys-
tem’s inputs can fail to prevent biased outputs. Organizations using
algorithms to help mediate access to important life opportunities
should consider other approaches to mitigating discriminatory ef-
fects.
1 INTRODUCTION
Organizations are now using algorithmic models1 (“algorithms”)
in a variety of important domains, including healthcare [36],
credit [21], employment [10, 27], and content distribution [4]. Some-
times, these algorithms can be benecial. But too often, they can
lead to discriminatory eects. For example, in the context of crimi-
nal justice, ProPublica showed that the COMPAS risk-assessment
tool [9] used by judges to help make bail decisions was particu-
larly likely to mislabel Black defendants as future criminals [12].
Similarly, facial recognition algorithms have been shown to per-
form signicantly worse for Black women [8]. Facebook, in its
quest to show relevant ads to users, diverts the delivery of employ-
ment and housing ads away from some demographic groups, even
when an advertiser is trying to reach a broad, diverse audience [4].
These kinds of discriminatory eects can be challenging to detect,
measure, and articulate.
Some have proposed mitigating discriminatory eects by remov-
ing demographic features from an algorithm’s inputs. For example,
as we discuss in more detail in Section 5.1, the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) recently proposed a rule
that would apply this approach to housing discrimination [24]. This
approach is awed, however, because algorithms can eectively
use omitted demographic features by combining other inputs that
are each correlated with the those features, potentially nullifying
any protection from discriminatory eects. This is particularly true
in large-scale machine learning (ML) systems, which take can as
input hundreds or thousands of features [6].
In this paper, we leverage a unique opportunity created by a re-
cent lawsuit settlement involving Facebook’s advertising platform
to explore the limits of this approach. Specically, we examine
Facebook’s Lookalike Audiences [19] targeting tool, which takes a
list of Facebook users provided by an advertiser (called the source
audience) and creates a new audience of users who share “common
qualities” with those in the source audience. In March 2018, the
National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) and others sued [15] Face-
book over violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) [1]. When the
case was settled in March 2019, Facebook agreed to modify the
functionality of Lookalike Audiences when used to target housing,
credit, and employment ads. In brief, Facebook created Special Ad
Audiences [3], which works like Lookalike Audiences, except its
1Throughout this paper, we refer to a large class of algorithmic models using the
now-common term “algorithms”, especially those created through statistical modeling
and machine learning.
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algorithm does not consider user prole elds of “age, gender, rela-
tionship status, religious views, school, political views, interested
in, or zip code” when detecting common qualities [28].
We seek to learn whether the Special Ad Audience algorithm
actually produces signicantly less biased audiences than the Looka-
like Audience algorithm. In other words, when provided with a
source audience that skews heavily toward one demographic group
over another, to what extent do each of these tools reproduce that
skew? We focus on skews along demographic features named in the
settlement, enabling us to examine whether simply removing the
protected features as input to an algorithm is sucient eliminate
bias along those features. To do so, we develop a methodology to
examine the delivery of the same ads when using the two types of
audiences, measuring the skew along the lines of gender, age, race,
and political views. Our results show that:
• For gender, our Special Ad audiences2 are biased to almost
the same degree as Lookalike audiences, with many of the
results being statistically indistinguishable. For example,
when using a source audience that is all women, our Looka-
like audience-targeted ad delivered to 96.1% women, while
the same ad targeted using Special Ad audiences delivered
to 91.2% women.
• For age, our Special Ad audiences are almost as biased as
Lookalike audiences when using source audiences that are
from a single age range or a controlled mix of two age ranges.
• For race, we use a dierent methodology to estimate the
racial makeup of the Lookalike and Special Ad Audiences, as
Facebook does not report the delivery along racial lines. Our
results suggest that Special Ad Audiences can skew along
racial lines, as is true for Lookalike Audiences.
• For political views, we use a similar methodology and nd a
similar skew for both Lookalike and Special Ad Audiences.
However, we observed less overall bias along political views
than race in both audience types.
• To underscore the real-world impact of these results, we
place ads as an employer who is seeking to nd candidates
“similar to” to their current workforce using Special Ad Au-
diences. Using a source audience consisting of Facebook
employees—identied by @fb.com email addresses—we nd
that the resulting Special Ad audience skews heavily towards
25–34-year-old men.
• We conrm that previous ndings on how Facebook’s deliv-
ery mechanisms can cause further skews in who is shown
ads hold for Special Ad Audiences. We show that an ad for ar-
ticial intelligence jobs delivers mostly to young men, while
an ad for supermarket jobs delivers mostly to middle-aged
women, despite targeting the same gender- and age-balanced
Special Ad audience.
Taken together, our results show that simply removing demo-
graphic features from the inputs of a large-scale, real-world al-
gorithm will not always suce to meaningfully change its outputs
with respect to those features. This work also demonstrates a
methodology by which other algorithms could be studied.
2Throughout the paper, we use “Lookalike Audience” or “Special Ad Audience” to
refer to the general tools provided by Facebook, and “Lookalike audience” or “Special
Ad audience” to refer to a particular audience created using the tool.
To be clear, we are not claiming—and do not believe—that Face-
book has incorrectly implemented Special Ad Audiences, or is in
violation of its settlement agreement. Rather, the ndings in this
paper are a natural result of how complex algorithmic systems work
in practice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides background on Facebook’s ad targeting tools and related
work. Section 3 introduces our methodology and Section 4 presents
our results. Section 5 provides a concluding discussion.
Ethics We took careful consideration of ethics when conducting
the research in this paper. First, we minimized harm to Facebook
users by only running “real” ads, i.e., if a user happened to click
on one of our ads, they were sent by Facebook to a real-world site
relevant to content the ad. We therefore did not have any direct
interaction with the users who were shown our ad, and did not
collect any of their personally identifying information. Second, we
minimized harm to Facebook by running and paying for our ads
just like any other advertiser. In cases where we were running
employment ads, we agged them as such using Facebook’s tools.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide background on Facebook’s ad targeting
tools, including Special Ad Audiences, and related work.
2.1 Facebook’s ad targeting tools
Facebook provides a range of targeting tools to help advertisers
select an audience of users who will be eligible to see their ads. For
example, advertisers can select users through combinations of tar-
geting attributes [20], including over 1,000 demographic, behavioral,
and interest-based features.
More germane to this paper and its methods, Facebook also oers
a number of other, more advanced targeting tools. One such tool is
Custom Audiences [47], which allows advertisers indicate individual
users that they wish to include in an audience. To use Custom
Audiences, an advertiser uploads a list of personally identiable
information (PII), potentially including names, email addresses,
phone numbers, dates of birth, and mobile identiers [13]. Face-
book then compares those identiers against its database of active
users, and lets the advertiser include matched users in their target
audience.
Another tool is Lookalike Audiences [19], which creates an audi-
ence of users who share “common qualities” with users in a Custom
audience provided by the advertiser (called the source audience).
A screenshot of Facebook’s advertiser interface is shown in Fig-
ure 1 (left); the advertiser must select the country where they wish
Facebook to select users from (“Audience Location”) and then must
select the fraction of that country’s population to include in the
new Lookalike Audience (ranging from 1% to 10%). Our prior work
has demonstrated that Lookalike Audiences can reproduce demo-
graphic skews present in source audiences [43].
2.2 Special Ad Audiences
In March 2018, the NFHA and others sued Facebook for allowing
landlords and real estate brokers to exclude members of protected
groups from receiving housing ads [15]. The lawsuit was settled
Figure 1: Screenshots of creation process for both Lookalike Audiences (left) and Special Ad Audiences (right). Both of them
are the same from the advertiser’s perspective: The advertiser rst selects a source Custom audience, then selects a target
country, and nally selects the fraction of that country’s users to include in the new audience.
in March 2019, and Facebook agreed to make a number of changes
to its ad targeting tools. Relevant here, Facebook agreed to change
how Lookalike Audiences (LAL) works when used with housing,
credit, and employment (HEC) ads [17]:
5. Lookalike Audience (“LAL”): In the HEC Flow,
LAL tool and marketing will be modied as fol-
lows:
(a) LAL tool may consider the following user
prole elds: country, region, profession and eld
of study. LAL tool will not consider the following
user prole elds: age, gender, relationship status,
religious views, school, political views, interested
in, or zip code.
Facebook now refers to this modied Lookalike Audiences tool as
Special Ad Audiences [3]. Facebook says [28]:
[Special Ad Audiences] will create an audience
based on similarities in online behavior and ac-
tivity but that does not use certain categories, in-
cluding age, gender, ZIP code or other similar cat-
egories.
From an advertiser’s perspective, Special Ad Audiences are created
just like Lookalike Audiences (i.e., based on a source Custom audi-
ence). A screenshot of Facebook’s interface for creating Lookalike
Audiences is shown in Figure 1 (left), and for Special Ad Audiences
in Figure 1 (right).
2.3 Related work
We briey overview related work on studying and mitigating algo-
rithmic bias, as well as Facebook’s advertising platform.
Algorithmic bias Concerns over bias in algorithms have galva-
nized a growing research community. This community has devel-
oped a number of approaches to algorithmic auditing [40], a process
of seeking to understand an algorithm’s inputs, outputs, and po-
tential for discriminatory eects. Researchers have successfully
studied a variety of widely deployed algorithmic systems includ-
ing face-recognition systems [8], e-commerce sites [26], search
engines [14, 25, 31, 32, 38], job seeking sites [10, 27], online trans-
lation services [7], or health-management [36]. A number of pro-
posals have been put forward to mitigate the potential algorithmic
biases; we refer the reader to a survey of both sources of bias and
mitigation approaches [35] for a more in-depth treatment.
We highlight a few works most closely related to our topic of
measurement. Greenberg distinguishes two kinds of fairness con-
cerns, distributive and procedural [30]. The former aims to assure
balanced outcomes, whereas the latter focuses on the process it-
self. Elimination of features from an algorithm’s input (as with
Special Ad Audiences) falls into the procedural category. Grgić-
Hlača et al. [23] propose a framework which relies on human moral
judgments to determine which features are fair to use. They point
out that while people can accurately judge relevance and privacy
aspects of a feature in decision making, they tend to fail at predict-
ing the impact that feature might have on the decision outcomes.
Specically, certain features might appear fair to human judges
even though they are correlated with sensitive features. In such
cases process fairness does not lead to outcome fairness, and ad-
ditional constraints must be enforced. Further, there are cases in
which none of the features is a strong proxy for a sensitive attribute
but features can form a proxy when combined [11, 39]. Finally,
even if none of the features or their combinations are unfair, their
predictive performance might be dierent across sub-populations.
Then, in an eort to to minimize the total error, the classier will
t the majority group better than the minority [29, 41]. Taken
together, these prior works paint a clear picture of process fairness
as insucient to ensure fair outcomes.
More recently, there has been a growing agreement among schol-
ars that focusing on particular algorithms is too narrow of a prob-
lem denition. Real-world algorithmic decision systems are often
composed of multiple algorithmic subsystems and can be discrimi-
natory as a whole, even if built from a series of fair algorithms [16]
Algorithms need to be modeled along with the other components
of the sociotechnical systems they are embedded in [42]. The bur-
den of these investigations lies on independent researchers and
auditors since the companies who operate these algorhtms might
not be incentivized to measure and address the externalities they
cause [37].
Facebook’s advertising platform Facebook runs one of the
world’s most powerful advertising platforms, and has been the
object of study for a number of research projects. Prior work has
demonstrated that Facebook was using PII provided for security fea-
tures (e.g., two-factor authentication) was used to allow advertisers
to target users with ads [46], that Custom Audiences can be used
to leak user’s PII [45], that Facebook’s ad targeting options oer a
variety of mechanisms to create discriminatory audiences [43], that
political advertisers on Facebook with higher budgets target people
using more privacy sensitive features [22] and that Facebook’s ad
delivery system itself may introduce unwanted biases when decid-
ing which users should be presented with life opportunity [4, 33]
and political ads [5].
3 METHODOLOGY
We now describe the methodology we use to study Lookalike and
Special Ad Audiences. Recall that our goal is to measure whether
Special Ad Audiences produce signicantly less biased audiences
than Lookalike Audiences. We therefore need to be able to generate
source audiences with controlled and known skew, from which we
can create a Lookalike and a Special Ad audience. To do so, we
re-use an approach from prior work [4], relying on voter records
from New York and North Carolina. These records are available to
the public, and include voters’ gender, age, location (address), and
(only in North Carolina) race.
Thus, for each demographic feature we wish to study, we rst
create a Custom audience based on the voter records (which we treat
as ground truth). For example, when studying gender, we select
a subset of the voters who are listed as female and use that list to
create a Custom audience. We use each biased Custom audience to
create both a Lookalike audience and a Special Ad audience. For
both types, we select users in the U.S. and choose the smallest size
option (1% of the population).
For some of our experiments, to measure the makeup of a target
audience, we run actual ads and record how they are delivered. For
these experiments, we need to provide an ad creative (consisting of
the ad text, headline, image, and destination URL). Unless otherwise
noted, we create a generic ad for Google Web Search, which has
basic text (“Search the web for information”) and a link to Google
Search. We found that Facebook does not verify that an ad that is
self-reported by an advertiser as a housing, credit, or employment
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Figure 2: Gender breakdown of ad delivery to Lookalike and
Special Ad audiences created from the same source audience
with varying fraction of male users, using the same ad cre-
ative. We can observe that both Lookalike and Special Ad
audiences reect the gender distribution of the source audi-
ence, despite the lack of gender being provided as an input
to Special Ad Audiences.
ad is, in fact, such an ad. Thus, we are able to run the same, generic
ad creative using both Lookalike and Special Ad audiences.
4 RESULTS
We now present our experiments and analyze the results. We rst
examine whether Lookalike and Special Ad Audiences can be biased
along the lines of gender and age, which are straightforward to
measure as Facebook provides delivery statistics in the advertiser
interface. Next, we focus on race and political views, using a dier-
ent methodology. Finally, we show the real-world implications of
these experiments using a series of employment and credit ads.
4.1 Gender
We begin by focusing on gender. We create seven Custom audiences
based on New York voter records. Each audience contains 10,000
individuals, with varying fractions of men: 0%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%,
60%, 80%, 100%. We then run ads to the resulting Lookalike and
Special Ad audiences, and compare the results in ad delivery as
reported by Facebook’s advertiser interface.
Figure 2 presents a summary of the results of this experiment,
and we make a number of observations. First, we can see that each
Lookalike audience clearly mirrors its source audience along gender
lines: the Lookalike audience derived from a male-only source
audience delivers to over 99% men, and the the Lookalike audience
derived from a female-only source audience delivers to over 97%
women. Second, we observe a slight male bias in our delivery,
relative to the source audience: for example, the Lookalike audience
derived from a source audience of 50% men actually delivered to
approximately 70% men. This male skew has been observed by prior
work [4, 33] and may be due to market eects or ad delivery eects
(which aect both Lookalike and Special Ad audiences equally).
Third, and most importantly, when we compare the delivery of each
Special Ad audience to its corresponding Lookalike audience, we
observe that a similar level of bias (that in some cases is statistically
indistinguishable). For example, the Special Ad audience derived
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Figure 3: Age breakdown of ad delivery to Lookalike and
Special Ad audiences created from the same source audience,
using the same ad creative. We can observe extremely simi-
lar levels of bias, despite the lack of age as an input to Spe-
cial Ad audiences. Panel A shows the results for source au-
diences consisting only of users in one age bracket. Panel
B shows the results of mixing the youngest and the oldest
users in dierent proportions.
from a male-only source audiences delivers to over 95% men, despite
being created without having access to users’ genders. Overall, the
Special Ad audiences show a bit less bias when compared to the
Lookalike audiences, but the trend is clear.
4.2 Age
Next, we turn to age. Facebook reports delivery based on users’
age in terms of xed ranges: 18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64,
65+. We therefore design an experiment based o of these ranges.
We create biased Custom audiences by selecting voter records that
consist only of 10,000 users within a single age range. As before,
we then run two ads for each Custom audience: one to a Lookalike
audience and another to a Special Ad audience.
Figure 3A presents the results, and the top six rows of Table A1
provide a more detailed breakdown (and includes the average age of
the delivery audience in the nal column). First, we can immediately
observe that that average age3 for both the Lookalike audience
and the Special Ad audience increases in the same manner, with
the average age being 21.9 for the audiences created from the 18–
24 age range and between 57 and 63 for the audiences created
from the 65+ age range. Second, examining the distribution of
delivery to each age range shows very similar trends in each pair
of audiences, with the 18–24 source audience delivering almost
exclusively to young Facebook users in both cases, and the 65+
source audience delivering primarily to older Facebook users in
both cases as well. Third, as with gender, we may be observing that
3We estimated the average age using weighted midpoints of each age range; it should
be viewed simply as a summary of the aggregate distribution and not the precise
average age.
Special Ad audiences are slightly less biased—the average age of
Special Ad audiences is closer to the median Facebook user age
in all of the older user groups compared to that of the Lookalike
audiences—but the overall eect is very strong.
Additionally, we look at what happens if we “mix” together
users from dierent age ranges, as opposed to running experiments
with a source audience from a single age range. Specically, we
mix together both old (65+) and young (18–24) users in dierent
proportions and examine the ultimate delivery audience for the
Lookalike and Special Ad audiences. Figure 3B and the bottom ve
rows of Table A1 present these results in the same format before. As
before, we can see that the average age follows a very similar trend
for both types of audiences, and that the breakdown in delivery
is quite similar as well. Thus, the eect we are observing is not
limited to homogeneous source audiences.
4.3 Race
Next, we turn to examine the extent to which Special Ad Audiences
can be biased along racial lines, in the same manner we have ob-
served Lookalike Audiences to be in past work [43]. We are unable
to re-use the same methodology for age and gender, which relied on
Facebook’s ad delivery statistics. Instead, we develop an alternative
methodology that relies on estimated daily results [48], which is an
estimate provided by Facebook of the number of users that match
the advertiser’s targeting criteria and can be reached within the
specied budget. We set the daily budget to the maximum allowed
value ($1M) to best approximate the number of users that match
the targeting criteria. Facebook returns these values as a range (e.g.,
“12,100 – 20,400 users”); throughout this procedure, we always use
the lower value.4
The procedure has two steps: audience creation and targeting.
Audience Creation. As before, we start with voter records from
North Carolina (which provide race information). We focus on
two racial groups: Black (dened as users who self-report as Non-
Hispanic Black) and white (dened as users who self-report as
Non-Hispanic white). For each race, we create two independent
Custom audiences: one list of 10,000 randomly selected users with
that race, and one list of 900,000 randomly selected users with that
race. We refer to these audiences as w_10k and w_900k (for the
white audiences) and b_10k and b_900k (for the Black audiences).
Next, we use the Custom audiences with 10,000 users to create
corresponding Lookalike and Special Ad audiences. We refer to
these audiences as Lw_10k (for the Lookalike audience based on
w_10k), Sw_10k (for the Special Ad audience), Lb_10k, and Sb_10k.
Our goal is then to estimate the racial bias of these Lookalike and
Special Ad audiences.
Targeting. We now use the ad targeting interface to obtain such
estimates. To do so, we begin the ad creation process and set our
budget is the maximal value allowed ($1M/day). We also specify
that we only target users in North Carolina.
Suppose we wish to obtain an estimate of the fraction of white
users in Lw_10k. To do so, we rst target the large white audience
w_900k audience and record the potential daily reach (e.g., 81,000).
4We repeated the procedure using both the midpoint as well as the upper value and
found similar results.
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Figure 4: Venn diagrams of overlap between Lookalike and
Special audiences created from samples of 10,000 Black and
white voters. While we do not know the race of the vast
majority of the created audiences, the part that we do know
shows racial bias.
We then target Lw_10k and record the potential daily reach (e.g.,
397,000). Finally, we target Lw_10k and exclude the w_900k audience,
and record the potential daily reach (e.g., 360,000). Now, we can
observe that excluding w_900k from Lw_10k caused the potential
daily reach to drop by 37,000, indicating that approximately 46%
(37,000/81,000) of w_900k were present in Lw_10k. We can then
repeat the process with excluding b_900k, and measure the fraction
of the large Black audience that is present in Lw_10k. By comparing
the fraction of w_900k and b_900k that are present in Lw_10k, we
obtain an estimate of the racial bias of Lw_10k.
Limitations. It is important to note that, unlike in our experi-
ments with gender and age, here we do not know the race of a
vast majority of the audience. This is because the Lookalike and
Special Ad audiences that Facebook creates consist mostly of peo-
ple who appear not to be in our voter records. Thus, the results
we present in this section only refer to the fraction of voters with
known race who are included in each Lookalike and Special Ad
audience, not the racial composition of these audiences overall, as
further emphasized in Figure 4. However, these estimates do give
us a small window into the makeup of these Lookalike and Special
Ad audiences.
Percent overlap
Black White
Source Type (b_900k) (w_900k)
100% Black Lookalike (Lb_10k) 61.0 16.0Special (Sb_10k) 62.3 12.3
100% white Lookalike (Lw_10k) 16.9 42.0Special (Sw_10k) 10.4 35.8
Table 1: Breakdown of overlap between audiences with
known racial makeup and Lookalike and Special Ad audi-
ences. While we do not know the race of the vast majority
of the created audiences, we see large discrepancies in the
race distribution among the known users.
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Figure 5: Both Lookalike and Special Ad audiences created
from source audiences of white users containing a higher
fraction of white users than Black users. Conversely, audi-
ences created from source audiences of Black users contain
a higher fraction of Black users than white users.
Results. We begin by presenting Venn diagrams in Figure 4 that
capture the overlap between all of the audiences. We summarize
the overlap between the Lookalike and Special Ad audiences and
the large white and Black audiences in Table 1. Focusing on the
table, we can immediately observe that both the Lookalike audi-
ences show signicantly more overlap with the race of the source
audience, suggesting that the makeup of the Lookalike audiences
are racially biased. For example, the Lookalike audience created
from b_10k contains 61% of the b_900k but only 16% of w_900k.
More importantly, the Special Ad audiences show a similar behavior
(though as before, perhaps with slightly less of a bias). Again, it
is important to keep in mind that we can only make estimates of
the fraction of w_900k and b_900k that overlap with the Lookalike
and Special Ad audiences, and cannot comment on the majority
of these audiences (as they likely fall outside of North Carolina).
Thus, our results are not conclusive—but only suggestive—that the
overall audiences are similarly biased.
Robustness. Here, we conrm that the presented results are ro-
bust to the random selection of seed from which Lookalike and Spe-
cial Ad audiences are created. To this end, we repeat the described
process with 20 non-overlapping b_10k and 20 non-overlapping
w_10k audiences. We create a Lookalike and a Special Ad audience
for each and compute the overlap with large b_700k and b_700k
audiences and report the resulting fractions in Figure 5. We note
that the racial skew observable in Lookalike audiences persists in
Special Ad audiences but the eect is slightly smaller.
4.4 Political views
We next turn to measure the extent to which Lookalike and Special
Ad Audiences can be biased along the lines of political views. As
with race, Facebook does not provide a breakdown of ad delivery
by users’ political views. Thus, we repeat the methodology we used
for race, using voter records from North Carolina and focusing on
the dierences in delivery to users registered as Republicans and
Democrats.
Figure 6: Ad creatives used throughout the paper. All of our ads linked directly to the domains shown in the ad.
Specically, we create source audiences of Republicans and
Democrats (r_10k and d_10k), as well as large Republican and
Democrat audiences (r_900k and d_900k). We then use the source
audiences to create both Lookalike audiences (Lr_10k and Ld_10k)
and Special Ad audiences (Sr_10k and Sd_10k). As with race, we run
the same generic ad to all audiences, and examine the fraction of
the large audiences that are present in the Lookalike and Special
Ad audiences.
We report the results in Table 2. We can observe a skew along
political views for Lookalike audiences (for example, the Lookalike
audience created from users registered as Democrats contains 51%
of d_900k but only 32% of r_900k). We can also observe that the
Special Ad audiences show a skew as well, though to a somewhat
lesser degree than the Lookalike audiences. As with the race exper-
iments, we remind the reader that we can only observe the overlap
between the created audiences and the large Democrat/Republican
audiences; we are unable to measure the majority of the created
audiences. However, the demonstrated skew suggests that there is
a bias in the overall makeup of the created audiences.
4.5 Real-world use cases
Next, we test a “real-world” use case of Special Ad Audiences. We
imagine an employer wants to use Facebook to advertise open posi-
tions to people who are similar to those already working for them.
The employer might assume that since the Special Ad Audiences
algorithm is not provided with protected features as inputs, it will
Percent overlap
Democrat Republican
Source Type (d_900k) (r_900k)
100% Democrat Lookalike Ld_10k 51.6 31.8Special Sd_10k 42.2 25.8
100% Republican Lookalike Lr_10k 28.1 50.0Special Sr_10k 25.0 47.0
Table 2: Breakdown of overlap between source audiences
with known political leaning and resulting Lookalike and
Special Ad audiences. While we do not know the political
leaning of the vast majority of the audiences, we see discrep-
ancies in the distribution among the known users.
allow them to reach users who are similar to their current employ-
ees without dramatic gender, age, or racial biases. The employer
would therefore upload a list of their current employees to create
a Custom audience, ask Facebook to create a Special Ad audience
from that source audience, and then target job ads to the resulting
Special Ad audience.
We play the role of this hypothetical employer (Facebook itself
in this example, which provides employees with an @fb.com email
address). We then run the following experiment:
(1) We create a Custom audience consisting of randomly gener-
ated American phone numbers, 11,000 of which Facebook
matched to existing users. This is our baseline audience that
we use to measure the bias in the created audience.
(2) We create another Custom audience consisting of 12,356,604
generated email addresses: all 2–5 letter combinations +
@fb.com, 11,000 of which Facebook matched to existing
users. This is our audience of Facebook employees.
(3) We create Special Ad audiences based on each of these two
Custom audiences.
(4) We run two generic job search ads (see Figure 6A), each to
one of these Special Ad audiences, at the same time, from the
same account, with the same budget. This way we eliminate
the side eects of optimization based on the ad content or
budget.
(5) We collect the delivery statistics with age/gender break-
down.
Figure 7 presents the results of the experiment. The Special
Ad audience based on Facebook employees delivers to 88% men,
compared to 54% in the baseline case. Further, the Special Ad
audience based on Facebook employees delivers to 48% to men
aged between 25-34, compared to 15% for the baseline audience.
Finally, 47% of all deliveries to the Facebook Special Ad audience
are to users in California, compared to 2% in the baseline audience.5
Overall, our results show that our hypothetical employer’s reliance
on Special Ad audiences to avoid discrimination along protected
classes was misplaced: their ad was ultimately delivered to an
5While matching based on state is not prohibited in the settlement, these numbers
indicate that our method of selecting Facebook employees based on random email
addresses @fb.com is correct.
audience that was signicantly biased along age and gender lines
(and presumably reective of Facebook’s employee population).
We conrm these ndings by running an additional experiment
in the “credit” category, advertising tips for building credit (see ad
copy in Figure 6B) to the same two Special Ad audiences. The results
of this experiment are presented in a similar format in Figure 8.
We observe that the ad targeting the Facebook-based audience still
delivers predominantly towards male and 25–34-year-old users.
However, we also observe a shift towards delivering to male users
in the random audience, even though it is the same audience as
in the generic job ad. This is likely an eect of the ad creative on
how Facebook algorithms estimate relevance to dierent groups of
people [4]. We further explore these eects in the next section.
4.6 Content-based skew in delivery
In previous work [4], we demonstrated that the skew in delivery can
be driven by Facebook’s estimated relevance of a particular ad copy
to a particular group of people. Specically, even when we held the
target audience constant, Facebook would deliver our ads to dier-
ent subpopulations: ads for supermarket jobs were shown primarily
to women, while ads for jobs in lumber industry were presented
mostly to men. Here, we show that these eects persist also when
using Special Ad Audiences. We re-use the Special Ad audience
created from the random 11,000 users which we expect to be ap-
proximately gender- and age-balanced. We then run generic job ads
along with ads for supermarket and articial intelligence pointing
to search for either keyword on indeed.com, see Figure 6A, C, and
D. We report the fraction of men in the reached audience in Figure 9;
we can immediately observe that the dierent ads skew towards
middle-aged women (in the case of supermarket jobs) or towards
younger men (in the case of articial intelligence jobs). This skew
when delivering ads to a gender-balanced audience underlines a
crucial point: when designing fairness/anti-discrimination controls,
one cannot just focus on one part of the algorithmic system. Instead
one must look at the whole socio-technical system, including how
an algorithm is used by real people, how people adjust their behav-
iors in response to the algorithm, and how the algorithm adapts to
people’s behaviors.
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Figure 7: Gender and age breakdown of a generic job ad de-
livery to a Special Ad audience based on random American
users (in orange) and a Special Ad audience based on Face-
book employees (in blue). The based on Facebook employ-
ees is predominantly male and 25-34.
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Figure 8: Gender and age breakdown of delivery of credit
building ads to a Special Ad audience based on random
American users (in orange) and a Special Ad audience based
on Facebook employees (in blue). The Facebook-based audi-
ence still delivers predominantly males aged 25-34, but the
random audience skews more male too.
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Figure 9: Gender and age breakdown of delivery of job ads to
a Special Ad audience based on randomAmerican users. We
observe that even if the source audience is held constant and
is approximately gender-balanced, the content of the ad can
still lead to large skews: ads for supermarket jobs deliver to
72% female audience, whereas ads for jobs in AI delivery to
66%male audience. Note also the skews in age: supermarket
jobs deliver mostly to people aged 35 and older, whereas the
AI jobs deliver nearly exclusively to people younger than 35.
5 DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated that both Lookalike and Special Ad Audi-
ences can create similarly biased target audiences from the same
source audiences. To reiterate, we are not claiming that Facebook
has incorrectly implemented Special Ad Audiences, nor are we
suggesting that the company has violated its settlement agreement.
Rather, our ndings are a result of a complex algorithmic system at
work.
Our ndings have broad and narrow implications. Broadly, we
demonstrate that simply removing demographic features from a
complex algorithmic system can be insucient to remove bias
from its outputs, which is an important lesson for government and
corporate policymakers. More specically, we show that relative
to Lookalike Audiences, Facebook’s Special Ad Audiences do little
to reduce demographic biases in target audiences. As a result, we
believe Special Ad Audiences will do little to mitigate discriminatory
outcomes.
5.1 Policy implications
In the U.S., President Trump’s administration has has directed a
range of civil rights ocials to reexamine how ‘disparate impact’
regulations might be changed or removed [34]. Disparate impact
is a legal doctrine that says facially neutral practices in employ-
ment, housing, credit, and other areas can still lead to a nding of
discrimination if they adversely aect a protected group. To date,
at least one regulator is considering new rules that would insulate
companies from disparate impact liability if their algorithms do
not rely on protected demographic factors. Our results strongly
indicate that this is a awed approach.
In August 2019, HUD published a proposed rule [24] to amend its
interpretation of the FHA in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling
in Texas Department of Housing and Community Aairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc. In particular, the proposed rule states in
§100.500(c)(2)(i) and (iii) that a defendant can claim a plainti has
failed to establish a prima facie case for disparate impact when:
... a plainti alleges that the cause of a discrimina-
tory eect is a model used by the defendant, such
as a risk assessment algorithm, and the defendant:
(i) Provides the material factors that make up
the inputs used in the challenged model and shows
that these factors do not rely in any material part
on factors that are substitutes or close proxies for
protected classes under the Fair Housing Act and
that the model is predictive of credit risk or other
similar valid objective;
This describes, in essence, the approach that the settlement pro-
scribed and led to the creation of Special Ad Audiences. Our results
reinforce what dozens of companies, advocates, and researchers
told HUD when its proposed rule was open for public comment: Re-
moving protected features from an algorithm’s inputs is not enough
to prevent discriminatory eects.
5.2 Legal implications
At a high level, U.S. federal law prohibits discrimination in the
marketing of housing, employment and credit opportunities. Our
ndings might have near-term legal consequences for advertisers
and even Facebook itself.
A creditor, employer, or housing provider who used biased
Special Ad audiences in their marketing could run afoul of anti-
discrimination laws. This could be exceptionally frustrating for an
advertiser who believed that Special Ad Audiences was an appro-
priate, legally-compliant way to target their ads.
Facebook itself could also face legal scrutiny. In the U.S., Sec-
tion 230 of the Communications Act of 1934 (as amended by the
Communications Decency Act) [2] provides broad legal immunity
to Internet platforms acting as publishers of third-party content.
This immunity was a central issue in the litigation resulting in the
settlement analyzed above. Although Facebook argued in court
that advertisers are “wholly responsible for deciding where, how,
and when to publish their ads” [18], this paper makes clear that
Facebook can play a signicant, opaque role by creating biased
Lookalike and Special Ad audiences. If a court found that the oper-
ation of these tools constituted a "material contribution" to illegal
conduct, Facebook’s ad platform could lose its immunity [44].
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APPENDIX
We present detailed results for the age experiment in Table A1.
